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Objective: The authors study how partners are
relevant to voting.
Background: Previous studies have assessed
whether having a partner influences political
participation. The authors focus on how hav-
ing a partner may affect political participation
in different ways. The authors theorize and ana-
lytically disentangle three mechanisms through
which partners relate to voting.
Method: The authors analyze the most recent
wave of the European Social Survey and limit the
analyses to people in a heterosexual relationship
who cohabit with their partner (n = 23,373).
In contrast to previous studies, the authors use
Diagonal Reference Models, which allow them
to disentangle the different ways in which part-
ners affect voting.
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Results: The authors find that both the educa-
tional level of the respondents and that of their
partners positively affect voting. In addition, the
relative position of a person in an educationally
heterogamous relationship proves to be related
to voting: Citizens whose level of education is
lower than that of their partner are less likely to
vote than people who have the same level of edu-
cation but who are in an educationally homoga-
mous relationship.
Conclusion: The authors argue that the lowest
educated partner in a heterogamous relation-
ship experiences a lower sense of entitlement to
participate politically. This study increases the
understanding of voting and underlines the polit-
ical relevance of the family.
Introduction
Various authors stress the potential importance
of individuals’ family contexts for political out-
comes in addition to well-researched individual
characteristics, such as gender, age, and educa-
tion (e.g., Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; Stoker &
Jennings, 1995; Zuckerman, 2005). Our study
adds to this literature by focusing on partners’
educational levels, as education is the most influ-
ential sociodemographic characteristic related to
voting (Blais, 2006; Wolfinger & Rosenstone,
1980). It is important to move beyond analyzing
the role of individuals’ own educational level,
as: “my behavior can be affected not only by my
education, but also by that of others around me.
The core issue is whether (holding constant my
own education), I am more likely or less likely
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to participate politically and socially if those
around me become more educated.” (Helliwell
& Putnam, 2007, p. 1).
We argue that the role partners play in voting
should be analytically disentangled into distinct
mechanisms. Specifically, we theorize how vot-
ing is affected by the educational level of the
partner and by educational heterogamy—that is,
relationships in which the partners differ in their
educational attainment. We test our hypotheses
by analyzing data from the most recent wave of
the European Social Survey (2016). We apply a
method that enables us to disentangle the role
of partner characteristics and educational het-
erogamy, hence allowing for a more in-depth
understanding of how partners affect voting.
How Partners Are Relevant to Voting
The Importance of Partners
In response to a plethora of studies with a focus
on individual-level socioeconomic or sociopsy-
chological characteristics, various authors have
stressed the role of individuals’ social envi-
ronments for explaining voting behavior. For
example, Beck (1991, p. 373) argued that we
should move away from treating the individual
as an autonomous actor and also focus on inter-
mediaries, such as personal networks and mass
media, through which voters get political infor-
mation. Similarly, Kenny (1993, p. 223) con-
tended that we should recognize political partic-
ipation as “both an individual and as a collective
process.” Various others have also stressed that
political outcomes are affected by social inter-
actions with significant others, especially one’s
partner (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; Jennings &
Niemi, 1971; Zuckerman, 2005).
Voting is often a joint activity for partners,
and partners may be a source of social pressure
or participants in political discussions. Indeed,
research finds that people most frequently men-
tion a spouse as their main political discussion
partner and that a spouse is one of the most
frequent targets for political persuasion (Kenny,
1993; Stoker & Jennings, 1995, 2005; Zucker-
man, 2005). Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980,
p. 45) argued that “the encouragement of a
wife or husband might be the push necessary
to get both partners to the polls.” Others have
claimed that marriage inspires voting via foster-
ing integration into one’s community (Kingston
& Finkel, 1987; Stoker & Jennings, 1995).
Against this background, much research has
focused on “the most elementary question: are
married people more likely to vote?” (Wolfin-
ger & Wolfinger, 2008, p. 1514). Most stud-
ies have reported that married citizens vote
more often than unmarried citizens (Kingston &
Finkel, 1987; Leighley & Nagler, 2013; Wolfin-
ger&Rosenstone, 1980;Wolfinger&Wolfinger,
2008), even though other studies have found no
(Highton &Wolfinger, 2001) or negative (Stoker
& Jennings, 1995) effects of being married on
the likelihood to vote.
We believe that it is important to take into
account that partners may affect voting in
different ways. Specifically, while extant stud-
ies focused on differences in voting behavior
between those with and those without a (mar-
ried) partner, we argue that an important next
step is to scrutinize why a partner influences
one’s voting. Disentangling the different ways in
which partners affect voting is crucial because
this influence may work via multiple, perhaps
even cross-pressuring, mechanisms. Conse-
quently, we theorize three analytically distinct
mechanisms. In so doing, we focus on people
in a heterosexual relationship who cohabit with
their partner. (Because of the social nature of the
different mechanisms, it makes sense to focus
on people sharing their daily lives and thus to
focus on cohabiting partners. Because of data
availability [see Data and Methods], we can
only address heterosexual relationships.)
Partners’ Educational Levels as a Boost
for Electoral Participation
It is plausible that citizens’ likelihood to vote is
positively associated with their partners’ level of
education (Gruneau, 2018; Stoker & Jennings,
1995; Zuckerman, 2005). As higher educated
people have higher levels of political participa-
tion and knowledge (Bovens & Wille, 2017), a
more educated spouse may increase one’s like-
lihood of voting because, for instance, of social
pressure and the provision of political informa-
tion. Therefore, we expect a positive association
between the educational level of the partner and
the likelihood to vote (Hypothesis 1). This aligns
with conventional ideas in the field: Partners as
a resource for political participation.
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The Paralyzing Aspect of Educational
Heterogamy
Research on the political relevance of part-
ners has generally assumed that partners only
introduce consonant viewpoints (e.g., Alford,
Hatemi, Hibbing, Martin, & Eaves, 2011;
Weiner, 1978) and that they “reinforce each
other’s political beliefs” (Bhatti & Hansen,
2012, p. 484; see also Wolfinger & Rosenstone,
1980, p. 45). This common assumption most
likely applies to educationally homogamous
relationships, that is, relationships in which both
partners have the same level of education. Such
relationships probably increase the likelihood
to vote, as citizens with firmly held beliefs are
more inclined to express these at the ballot box.
However, the situation is likely different
in educationally heterogamous relationships.
There is overwhelming evidence that one’s level
of education is associated with a wide range of
political attitudes (Van der Waal & De Koster,
2015; Weakliem, 2002), indicating that people
with different levels of education are likely
to have different political views. This implies
that educationally heterogamous relationships
are likely to be characterized by dissonant,
instead of congruent, political viewpoints. In
such relationships, one’s political beliefs will
more often be challenged, which may result
in the decision to abstain from voting. Hence,
we hypothesize that educational heterogamy is
negatively associated with the likelihood to vote
(Hypothesis 2).
Relative Positions in Heterogamous
Relationships and a Sense of Entitlement
In addition to the relevance of educational het-
erogamy as discussed previously, one’s relative
position in a heterogamous relationship may
relate to voting, as it can affect one’s sense of
entitlement. Indeed, we have to consider “the
(socially authorized and encouraged) sense of
being entitled to be concerned with politics”
(Bourdieu, 1984, p. 409; cf. Laurison, 2015).
Tellingly, a recent experimental study demon-
strates that less-educated respondents are less
inclined to participate politically if they are con-
fronted with the higher rates of political partic-
ipation of more-educated citizens (Spruyt, Kup-
pens, Spears, & Van Noord, 2018). This indi-
cates that a higher level of education fuels a
greater “sense of being a relevant and legitimate
citizen who matters in society” and that it gener-
ates a sense of entitlement to participate polit-
ically (Ten Kate, De Koster, & Van der Waal,
2017, p. 64; cf. Lamont, Beljean, & Clair, 2014;
Laurison, 2015).
As processes of social comparison are also
at play in relationships (Heckert, Nowak, &
Snyder, 1998), we apply this insight about
general social comparisons to the level of
relationships. We theorize that one’s relative
educational level may be especially salient for
political participation in case of cohabiting
partners. After all, in these cases people are
confronted with and reminded of their educa-
tionally “superior” or “inferior” position on a
daily basis. Consequently, one’s educational
level when compared with that of one’s cohab-
iting partner may impact one’s voting via one’s
sense of entitlement. Therefore, we expect that
the highest educated person in a heterogamous
relationship will have a higher likelihood to
vote than someone with an equal educational
level who is in a homogamous relationship
(Hypothesis 2a). In contrast, the partner with the
lowest educational level in a heterogamous rela-
tionship is expected to be less likely to vote than
someone with the same educational level who is
in a homogamous relationship (Hypothesis 2b).
Data, Measures, and Methods
Data and Measures
We use data from the most recent wave of the
European Social Survey (ESS; Norwegian Cen-
tre for Research Data, 2016), which includes
information on 23 countries (n = 44,210). We
apply poststratification weights provided by the
ESS. We focus on a subset (n = 25,633) of
these data by excluding all individuals who did
not live together with a partner (n = 18,298)
and same-sex couples (n = 455). Due to listwise
deletion of missing values, the sample for our
analyses consists of 23,373 individuals.
Voting was measured using the following
question: “Some people don’t vote nowadays for
one reason or another. Did you vote in the last
[country] national election in [month/year]?”
People who were not eligible to vote (n = 3,687)
were omitted from the analysis; 81% of our sam-
ple did vote.
Education and educational heterogamy. Based
on the International Standard Classification of
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Table 1. Cross-Tabulation of Educational Level of the Respondent and That of Her or His Partner
Educational level respondent Educational level partner
Low Medium High Total
n % n % n % n
Low 3,120 13.3 1,472 6.2 225 1.0 4,817
Medium 1,656 7.1 8,418 36.0 1,924 8.2 11,998
High 335 1.4 2,322 10.0 3,901 16.6 6,558
Total 5,111 12,212 6,050 23,373
Education 2011, we classified the educational
level of respondents and their partners into one
of the following three categories: low (for the
categories “lower than lower secondary” and
“lower secondary” in the original ESS dataset),
medium (for “lower tier secondary,” “upper tier
secondary,” and “advanced vocational”), and
high (for “lower tertiary” and “higher tertiary”).
Individuals in the category “other” (for edu-
cational level respondent: n = 88; for educa-
tional level partner: n = 60) were coded as miss-
ing. Table 1 presents the cross-tabulation of the
educational level of the respondents with that
of their partners. Educational heterogamy is
a dichotomous variable indicating whether a
respondent and her or his partner have dif-
ferent educational levels and relates to all the
off-diagonal cells in Table 1. Next, we created
the following two dichotomous variables tomea-
sure the relative positions in heterogamous rela-
tionships: individuals above (under) the diago-
nal are those who are the lowest (highest) edu-
cated person in a heterogamous relationship. For
our three heterogamy measures, individuals in a
homogamous relationship—that is, those on the
diagonal—represent the reference category.
Control variables. To account for spuriousness,
we control for variables that are related to both
voting and educational level. We select these
control variables based on extant literature (e.g.,
Bhatti & Hansen, 2012; Gallego, 2007; Hadjar
& Beck, 2010; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980;
Wolfinger & Wolfinger, 2008). We control for
age (centered around the mean of 52; SD = 15)
and gender (50% women). (We tested whether
the mechanisms through which partners affect
voting [Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis
2a, and Hypothesis 2b] are gendered. Our anal-
yses [not reported] demonstrate that this is not
the case: Models including interactions to test
whether the effects of the educational level of
the partner and educational heterogamy are dif-
ferent for men and women have worse fit than
the models presented in Table 2). In addition,
we control for the legal status of the relationship
(81% married) and whether the respondent has
children living at home (49%). Migrant status
is a dichotomous variable differentiating natives
from immigrants. Individuals were considered
immigrants (16%) if at least one parent was born
abroad. For religious denomination, we distin-
guish between “none” (39%), “Catholic” (35%),
“Protestant” (13%), and “other” (13%). Finally,
we control for political interest, which was mea-
sured as a series of dummies created using the
following question: “How interested would you
say you are in politics?” When responding to a
four-point Likert-type item, answers varied from
“not at all interested” (14%; reference category)
to “very interested” (14%).
Method: Diagonal Reference Models
To test our hypotheses, we need to analytically
separate how voting is associated with (a) the
educational level of the respondent, (b) the edu-
cational level of the respondent’s partner, and
(c) educational heterogamy. To simultaneously
model these associations, we apply Diagonal
Reference Models (DRMs). DRMs were devel-
oped by Sobel (1981) to study the consequences
of social mobility and allow disentangling of
the extent to which individuals are affected by
their social position of origin, their social posi-
tion of destination, and their experience of social
mobility (e.g., Daenekindt, 2017). DRMs are
also perfectly suited to model the relevance of
heterogamy as they allow researchers to disen-
tangle how both the characteristics of each part-
ner and heterogamy are associated with a depen-
dent variable (Eeckhaut, Van de Putte, Gerris, &
Vermulst, 2013; Van der Waal, Daenekindt, &
De Koster, 2017).
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Table 2. Parameter Estimates for Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 on Voting (n= 23,373)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable OR 95% CIa OR 95% CIa OR 95% CIa
Diagonal intercepts
Low education 0.58* [0.46, 0.73] 0.60* [0.48, 0.76] 0.60* [0.47, 0.75]
Medium education 1.00 [0.81, 1.24] 1.02 [0.83, 1.26] 1.02 [0.83, 1.27]
High education 1.78* [1.42, 2.25] 1.85* [1.46, 2.34] 1.83* [1.45, 2.32]
Weight parameterb
Educational level respondent (p) 0.67* [0.56, 0.78] 0.67* [0.57, 0.78] 0.32 [−0.14, 0.78]
Educational level partner (1−p) 0.33* [0.22, 0.44] 0.33* [0.22, 0.43] 0.68* [0.22, 1.14]
Heterogamy measures (in homogamous relationship = ref.)
In heterogamous relationship 0.92* [0.85, 0.99]
Respondent higher educated than partner 1.15 [0.85, 1.54]
Partner higher educated than respondent 0.74* [0.55, 0.99]
Controls
Gender (men = ref.) 1.16* [1.07, 1.25] 1.16* [1.08, 1.25] 1.16* [1.08, 1.25]
Age (centered) 1.03* [1.03, 1.03] 1.03* [1.03, 1.03] 1.03* [1.03, 1.03]
Migrant status (native = ref.) 0.49* [0.44, 0.55] 0.49* [0.44, 0.55] 0.50* [0.44, 0.55]
Religious denomination (none = ref.)
Catholic 1.48* [1.33, 1.64] 1.47* [1.33, 1.64] 1.47* [1.33, 1.64]
Protestant 1.73* [1.47, 2.03] 1.73* [1.47, 2.03] 1.73* [1.47, 2.03]
Other 0.79* [0.67, 0.93] 0.79* [0.67, 0.93] 0.79* [0.67, 0.93]
Political interest (not at all = ref.)
Hardly interested 2.55* [2.31, 2.81] 2.55* [2.31, 2.81] 2.55* [2.31, 2.81]
Quite interested 5.35* [4.77, 5.99] 5.37* [4.79, 6.02] 5.37* [4.79, 6.02]
Very interested 6.98* [5.89, 8.27] 7.01* [5.91, 8.31] 7.01* [5.92, 8.31]
Children at home 1.13* [1.04, 1.23] 1.14 [1.05, 1.23] 1.14* [1.05, 1.23]
Married 1.35* [1.23, 1.50] 1.35* [1.22, 1.49] 1.35* [1.22, 1.49]
Country dummies (not shown) INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED
𝜒2diff (vs. M1) 4.43
* 6.70*
Df diff 1 2
Note:M1 = Model 1; ref. = reference. aConfidence intervals are based on robust standard errors. bThe weight parameters
are not odds ratios. *p < .05.
We specify the baseline DRM (Model 1)
as Y ijk = p * μii + (1− p) * μjj +
∑
𝛽xijkl + eijk.
DRMsmodel behavior of individuals in heterog-
amous relationships as a function of behavior of
people in different homogamous relationships
(Eeckhaut et al., 2013). Therefore, estimates
of voting of respondents in an educationally
homogamous relationship—which are located
on the diagonal of the cross-tabulation of
the educational level of each partner—are
combined to estimate voting of respondents
in educationally heterogamous relationships.
These so-called diagonal intercepts are repre-
sented in the equation as μii and μjj. Therefore,
the behavior of individuals in heterogamous
relationships with educational levels i and
j is modeled as a function of the behavior
of respondents in homogamous relationships
characterized by these educational levels (i.e.,
μii and μjj). Subsequently, p—which lies in the
interval [0, 1]—indicates the relative importance
of the educational level of the respondent (i.e.,
i); 1−p indicates the relative importance of the
educational level of the respondent’s partner
(i.e., j). Hence, this baseline model provides a
test for the importance of the educational level
of the partner (specifically, it tests if 1−p is
significantly larger than 0). To test the other
hypotheses, we need to extend the baseline
model. The different model specifications are
presented in Table 3.
Findings
We used Turner and Firth’s Dref subcommand
of the gnm R package (Turner & Firth, 2007).
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Table 3. Specification of the Models for Testing Our Hypotheses
Model Specification
1 Y ijk = p×μii + (1− p)×μjj +
∑
𝛽xijkl + eijk
p: the relative importance of the educational level of the respondent for voting
(1-p): the relative importance of the educational level of the respondent’s partner for voting
This model tests if the educational level of the partner is positively associated with voting (Hypothesis 1)
2 Y ijk = p×μii + (1− p)×μjj +𝜷h ×het+
∑
𝛽xijkl + eijk
het: 0 = homogamous relationship; 1 = heterogamous relationship
This model tests if heterogamy is negatively associated with voting (Hypothesis 2)
3 Y ijk = p×μii + (1− p)×μjj +𝜷hh × hethi+𝜷hl ×hetlo+
∑
𝛽xijkl + eijk
hethi: 1 = respondent is the highest educated person in a heterogamous relationship; 0 = other
hetlo: 1 = respondent is the lowest educated person in a heterogamous relationship; 0 = other
This model tests if the relative position in a heterogamous relationship is associated with voting (Hypothesis 2a
and Hypothesis 2b)
Note: Because of the binary character of the dependent variable, we apply a logit link function to each model.
To account for the clustered nature of our
data—that is, respondents from the same
country tend to be more similar than two
randomly chosen respondents—we did two
things. First, we estimated fixed effects models
with country dummies to remove unobserved
heterogeneity between countries. Second, we
estimated robust standard errors that correct for
heteroscedasticity. To calculate these, we used
the sandwich R package (Zeileis, 2004, 2006).
Considering the number of countries in our data,
we relied on the heteroscedasticity consistent
covariance matrix HC3 (Long & Ervin, 2000).
We first considered the baseline model
(Model 1), which is presented in Table 2. The
diagonal intercepts in Model 1 indicated that
voting is stratified. That is, people in a homog-
amous relationship had lower odds to vote if
they had lower educational levels (e.g., 0.58)
than if they were higher educated (e.g., 1.78).
The weight parameters provided insight into
the relative importance of the educational level
of respondents and their partners. Both weight
parameters were significantly higher than 0
(0.67 and 0.33, respectively). This indicated that
both the educational level of the partner and
the educational level of the respondent mattered
for voting. In other words, controlling for one’s
own educational level, the higher the educa-
tional level of one’s partner, the more likely one
was to vote. This corroborates Hypothesis 1.
To test the other hypotheses, we moved to the
more complex models specified in Table 3. We
compared the models using the Chi-squared test.
Both Model 2 (p = .04) and Model 3 (p = .04)
were superior to Model 1. The results of Models
1, 2, and 3 are presented in Table 2.
Models 2 and 3 included different measures
of educational heterogamy. Model 2 included a
dummy variable indicating whether the respon-
dent was in an educationally heterogamous rela-
tionship (for testing Hypothesis 2). In Model 3,
heterogamy was further specified by including
separate dummies for being the highest and for
being the lowest educated person in a relation-
ship (reference category: being in a homoga-
mous relationship). The parameter estimates for
these different types of heterogamy had dif-
ferent signs as expected based on our theoriz-
ing on one’s relative position in a heteroga-
mous relationship (i.e., Hypotheses 2a and 2b):
Being higher educated than one’s partner affects
voting positively (but insignificantly), whereas
being less educated than one’s partner is nega-
tively related to voting. These contrasting effects
indicated that the modest parameter estimate
of heterogamy in Model 2 was the result of a
cross-pressure (i.e., a net result of two under-
lying opposing effects). Model 3 demonstrated
that it was vital to separately estimate parame-
ters for being the highest and being the lowest
educated in a heterogamous relationship. More-
over, if Hypothesis 2 on the paralyzing effect of
heterogamy on voting were correct, both param-
eters for heterogamywould be negative inModel
3, which was not the case. In short, we found no
evidence for Hypothesis 2 and select Model 3.
The estimates in Model 3 indicated that
being less educated than one’s partner mattered:
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Figure 1. Cross-tabulation of the educational levels of both partners representing the odds to vote
(shading proportional to size of odds).
Respondents whose partners were higher edu-
cated than themselves were less likely to vote
when compared with individuals who were in an
educationally homogamous relationship. Thus,
for example (net of the separate effects of the
educational level of the respondent and of the
partner, addressed in Hypothesis 1), citizens
with a low level of education who had a partner
that also had a low level of education had 1.35
(= 1/0.74) higher odds to vote than citizens
with a low level of education whose partner
had a medium or high level of education. This
supported Hypothesis 2b. As the parameter
estimate (1.15) for being the highest educated in
a heterogamous relationship was not significant,
we found no evidence for Hypothesis 2a.
To aid interpretation, we visualized the
results of the DRM analyses consistent with
Daenekindt, Van der Waal, and De Koster
(2018, p. 278) in Figure 1. For each cell in
the cross-tabulation of educational level of
the respondent and that of her or his partner,
Figure 1 presents the odds to vote. The odds
in the visualization are based on Model 3 and
represent individuals who have the mean age
and are in the reference category of each other
control variable. Consistent with Hypothesis
1, the odds to vote increased with the level
of education of the partner. For respondents
with a low level of education, the odds to vote
were 0.60 if their partner also had a low level
of education, whereas the odds were 0.64 and
0.94 if their partner had a medium or high level
of education, respectively. The fact that this
increase in odds was very modest was because
of the simultaneously operating effect of being
less educated than one’s partner (as reflected in
Hypothesis 2b). If this dampening effect did not
exist, the educational level of the partner would
more strongly boost one’s likelihood to vote.
Generally, in every heterogamous relationship,
the likelihood of voting of the lowest educated
person was reduced because of his or her rela-
tive position (the cells with borders around the
numbers).
Conclusion
Major Findings
We scrutinized how partners are relevant to vot-
ing.We followed up on the literature that stresses
the importance of individuals’ social environ-
ments, including their partners, on political out-
comes. In addition to extant studies that ana-
lyzed whether partners affect one’s inclination
to vote, we argued that one’s partner is likely to
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affect one’s inclination to vote in different ways.
We theorized three distinct mechanisms through
which the educational level of one’s partner may
affect voting, applied a method to disentangle
these in our analyses, and assessed their empir-
ical relevance. Consistent with previous work
(e.g., Gruneau, 2018), our analyses showed that
the higher educated one’s partner is, the more
likely it is that one will vote. This finding aligns
with how the literature usually considers the role
of partners for voting: As a resource for political
participation. People acquire political compe-
tences and a willingness to vote by being social-
ized and/or pressured by their higher educated
partner.
In addition, we found that educational het-
erogamy matters. Specifically, we found that cit-
izens whose level of education is lower than that
of their partner are less likely to vote than peo-
ple who have the same level of education but
who are in an educationally homogamous rela-
tionship. This is consistent with literature that
stresses the importance of a sense of entitle-
ment (Bourdieu, 1984; Laurison, 2015; Spruyt
et al., 2018; Ten Kate et al., 2017). It is likely
that people who are confronted with a higher
educated partner on a daily basis consider them-
selves to be less entitled and less qualified to hold
and express political opinions, which under-
lies a lower likelihood to vote. This conclu-
sion improves our understanding of how edu-
cation relates to political outcomes. Consistent
with Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry (1996; cf. Hel-
liwell & Putnam, 2007), our results underline
the importance of relative education. Indeed, we
argue that in addition to the substantive role of
education—as a way to acquire political compe-
tences and knowledge, for instance—education
is relevant because it associates with a sense of
entitlement to participate politically.
However, in contrast to our expectations, the
highest educated person in a heterogamous rela-
tionship is not more likely to vote than equally
educated citizens in a homogamous relation-
ship. An explanation may be found in psycho-
logical research, which finds that people com-
pare themselves primarily with people they con-
sider superior (Suls, Martin, & Wheeler, 2002).
This may explain why the relative position in
heterogamous relationships—via processes of
social comparison—only appears to be relevant
for the sense of entitlement of the lower educated
partner.
Limitations and Opportunities for Future
Research
By studying the different ways in which part-
ners’ educational levels affect voting, we
contributed to the literature on individual-level
drivers of voting behavior. As the way partners
affect voting may be context specific, future
research could build on our study by engaging
with the rich body of literature on the role of
characteristics of institutional contexts, such
as compulsory voting, for political outcomes
(e.g., Powell, 1986). As a first step in theorizing
and scrutinizing various mechanisms linking
partner characteristics to voting, we analyzed
cross-sectional European data by including
country fixed effects. We encourage other
researchers to build on our insights and to study
longitudinal and cross-national differences in
how partners are relevant for voting. In so doing,
attention could also be paid to disentangling
age, period and cohort effects, which is espe-
cially salient because educational homogamy
has undergone considerable changes due to the
vast increase of women’s enrollment in higher
education.
In addition, it would be worthwhile to collect
data on partner characteristics in election sur-
veys. First, this would allow for more precise
measurements. Because the ESS data collection
was not designed to coincide with national elec-
tions, some respondentsmay have had a different
partner during the elections than when the sur-
vey was fielded. In our analyses, cross-country
variation in this time lag was captured by coun-
try fixed effects, but remaining within-country
random measurement error may have biased
our coefficients downwardly, suggesting that we
provided conservative tests of our hypotheses.
Measuring the educational level of the partner
during national elections would help to over-
come this. Second, election surveys would ben-
efit from including additional partner charac-
teristics. While we focused on level of edu-
cation because this is a key factor in shap-
ing the likelihood to vote and because rele-
vant high-quality, large-scale data are available,
other partner characteristics—such as occupa-
tion, income, or age—might matter as well.
Analyses of data containing richer information
on partner characteristics would not only allow
to control for potential confounders but also
could be used to assess the relative importance
of a wider range of theoretical mechanisms link-
ing partner characteristics to voting. This would
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be an important next step in the literature on the
political relevance of the family.
Study Contribution
The role of the partner is often linked to
the gender gaps in political attitudes and in
political participation (e.g., Giger, 2009; Pratto,
Stallworth, & Sidanius, 1997). With regard to
political attitudes, for example, Stoker and Jen-
nings (2005, p. 66) argue that spousal influence
reduces or eliminates the gender gap. While we
address political participation instead of atti-
tudes, our findings nevertheless may nuance this
claim. The suggestion that partners only affect
each other politically by erasing differences
between partners reflects the conventional focus
on political socialization and social pressure
within relationships. However, we demonstrated
that, in addition to one’s educational level and
that of the partner, one’s relative position in the
relationship affects political outcomes, leading
to larger differences between partners. This sug-
gests that the relevance of spousal influence for
the gender gap in political attitudes and behavior
is more complex than typically assumed.
Our finding that the relative position in a
relationship is relevant for voting resonates with
research on the impact of one’s relative position
in society on various outcomes. This relative
position can “bias people’s expectations for their
own and the other’s competence and suitability
for authority in a situation” (Ridgeway, 2014,
p. 5). We have theorized that the relative position
may also—and perhaps especially—be salient
for cohabiting partners, as people are confronted
with their “superior” or “inferior” position in this
context on a daily basis.
We focused on voting as it is an obvious
choice for assessing the potential political
relevance of partner characteristics. However,
we expect that our theory and findings can be
extended beyond voting and potentially apply
to other forms of political and civic participa-
tion. Systematically scrutinizing how partners
are relevant to political outcomes promises to
increase our understanding of processes of polit-
ical socialization and inequalities in political
outcomes in general and the political relevance
of the family in particular.
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